Sageman and Leaderless Jihad — Wrap-up

July 22, 2008 by Gee Carol · Leave a Comment

Today’s post wraps up those from my “Classic” series on Mark Sageman’s “Leaderless Jihad.” Sageman, an ex CIA agent and forensic psychiatrist, has researched the radical groups of Islamist jihadis. He first published on the subject in 2004, with “Understanding Terror Networks.” He presented his most recent theories in late 2007, in “Leaderless Jihad,” which he discussed at the New America Foundation on 2/20/08. My first four posts about Sageman’s work are linked below.*

At the end of his discussion Marc Sageman did a Q & A. Out of this and the earlier part of his talk, which I covered in the *previous posts, several significant ideas stuck with me. This youthful wave of jihad is about pride, about becoming “heroes for justice.” According to Sageman, they will be defeated by drugs, sex, and rock and roll, just as other “cool” movements. We have overstated the threat using exaggerated scare tactics. Al Qaeda Central with 40-50 members, however still is very serious and Sageman reminded his audience that. “They still want to kill us.”

A major jihadi goal is expelling The Enemy from the lands of Islam. Jihadis do not feel there will be a future for them in their home countries until the repressive Mid-East regimes supported by Western countries are replaced. There is a poverty of positive role models for the youth of these countries.
The original al Qaeda movement evolved into three waves, the third inspired by the the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Its current state has degraded and been watered down over time. The Internet jihadis are not particularly religious. And all jihadis — from those few left in Osama bin Laden’s group to today’s untold thousands inhabiting their virtual chat-rooms — remain very dangerous “rejectionists” who want to become heroes by fighting Americans or Europeans.
Sageman is pessimistic about Europe. The prognosis of progress in rooting out terrorism in Europe is not good. Sageman believes that European countries do not yet assimilate Muslims as well as does the United States. Noting that these jihadis are third generation of Muslims of imported labor brought in to rebuild Europe after the war. Often they come from north Africa or south Asia. Sageman’s research found that most of them do not speak Arabic or read the Koran.
There was no trauma that triggered jihadis’ radicalization and violence, nor does it come out of humiliation. It is about injustice (killings, rapes, unfair arrests, etc). They become more radicalized via interaction with each other. Poverty is a rationalization that comes later. Sageman does not feel their rehabilitation is possible. But he feels the wave of “Jihadi Cool” will fade decay for internal reasons.
The current 140-150 members of Al Qaeda got a new lease on life through the non-aggression agreement between Pakistan and its Tribal Areas in Waziristan. They are now more in the open, meeting with the European jihadis in Mir Alley, but it is not a resurgence. Most European jihadis are not accepted into Al Qaeda, but are trained and sent home with their assignments. Many are then arrested and the plots disrupted.
Who are the targets of jihad? First choices are uniformed Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of second choice would be “official” Americans, symbols of America abroad such as embassies. They are not trying that hard to come to America. “The lines at the airport are just too daunting,” Sageman observed wryly. The final targets don’t get much thought, according to his research. Many jihadis get caught up in the desire to acquiring means and weapons, which are then used against random targets of easy opportunity.
Counter-terrorism? Sageman believes we cannot encourage people to become terrorists by occupying their countries. He admits we are somewhat “stuck,” limited in what we can do in Iraq. Caught in the crossfire, we must learn to leave a smaller footprint. “We can’t have Americans killing Muslims, no matter what,” Sageman asserts. Sageman reminded his audience that the U.S. has generally done well with its own Muslim communities.
Afghanistan is a unique situation; mchange will be slow and from the bottom up. We are a threat to the local way of life. As other Western countries sometimes knew in the past, and as recently in Iraq’s Al Anbar province, “divide and rule” worked well. When we “lumped” all afghan fighters into one group, they unified. Lately there have been fragile Al Qaeda alliances with tribes or parts of very “Xenophobic” tribes. There are many thousands of Taliban, a resistance movement to the central governments, with overtones of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism.

*Posts in Series: First/Itro , Second/Threat Evolves, Third/Networks, Fourth/Global Islam.

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Tagged: jihad, sageman, terrorism

Sageman on Leaderless Jihad — 4

July 15, 2008 by Gee Carol · 2 Comments

“The Evolution of Global Islamic Terror”

Today’s post is the fourth from my “Classic” series laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman — (see “32 page power-point,” pdf link *below). In previous posts I gave an overview of Dr. Sageman’s exploration of the dynamics of radicalization, of how people eventually get on the path to political violence. He maintains that these are young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory and the sense of belonging to an important group and cause. It is a bottom-up process involving four major factors: 1) There is a sense of moral outrage. 2) There is a specific interpretation of the meaning of the precipitating event or events. 3) It resonates with their own personal experience. 4) The mobilization takes place through networks.

Three waves of radicalism, according to Sageman, marked the evolution of the violent jihadi movements. ( See pp 31-32 of Sageman’s PowerPoint* below). The first, 1980-1988, was begun in Pakistan and Afghanistan by Osama bin Laden and his companions, the “African Arabs.” They were well educated, predominately Egyptian, around age 30 at the time. That group is now ” al Qaeda Central.” Dr. Sageman reports that there are dozens left in this group.

The second wave, the fairly well educated expatriates, were trained terrorists who were radicalized in the West during the 1990’s. It culminated in the attacks in the U.S. on 9/11/01. These men went to al Qaeda in Afghanistan to be accepted, as have many others exerting bottom-up pressure on the leaders. Only about 15% get accepted as they did, Dr. Sageman found in his research. This group, average age 25, now numbers about 100.

Leaderless Jihad – the current third wave is a transition phase. Sageman names this post-Iraq invasion group “Terrorist Wannabees,” noting that jihad has undergone a complete transformation and has somewhat degraded . This is the poorly educated “homegrown” group not al Qaeda trained. Most were turned away by al Qaeda Central A few were quickly trained and sent home. For example, the British Pakistani terrorists had links to radicals in Kashmir, so had an “in” through fellow-travelers in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

This third wave evolved from the bottom up, is scattered and connected through “virtual” means. The average age is 20; they potentially number in the thousands.

“The undisciplined followers are the leaders. The threat,” says Sageman, “is self-limiting and fed by fantasies of wanting to be recognized as heroes.”

They have no long term goals or strategy. Sageman believes that the end state is the more unattractive “Taliban” form than those more religious jihadis originally advocating the Salafist state. He noted that such a Salafist State (ousting the West) was the intent of the uprisings in Algeria, the fight against the Russians in Afghanistan, as well as the migration of al Qaeda to fight in the al Anbar province of Iraq.

The evolution of the process of radicalization in a hostile environment into survival mode, enabled by the Internet with its redundancy and anonymity, makes Europe more vulnerable than the U.S. This is due to the culture, social conditions and ability to network offline. Undisciplined, vulnerable targets, they have no ability to progress into a political party. Self-limiting, Sageman believes they have no incentive to compromise. There is the constant push of each new “hothead,” with an escalation of atrocities and eventual loss of appeal. Dr. Sageman believes the threat may have already “crested” in France.

To be continued – Q & A following the PowerPoint.

Sageman and Leaderless Jihad — 3

July 8, 2008 by Gee Carol · Leave a Comment

FISA Fights – Given that U.S. Senators and House members were somewhat in disagreement over how to refine the law on conducting foreign surveillance of “terrorist threats,” I need to return to my series on global jihad. I am continuing the process of analyzing the true nature of the threat. To do this I have turned to a new “guru” whose work seems believable and very significant to me:

A Discussion with Marc Sageman on Leaderless Jihad, was a program held at the New America Foundation on Feb. 20, 2008. {This link can provide full video or audio of the event. Here is the link to Sageman’s 32 page power-point presentation; it includes his main lecture ideas.} To quote the synopsis:

Jihad and 21st Century Terrorism,

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. Rather, it serves as an inspiration for individuals and other groups who have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name.

Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s, builds upon his bestselling book, Understanding Terror Networks, to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In the recently published Leaderless Jihad, Sageman rejects the idea that certain individuals are predisposed to terrorism. He argues that the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process of radicalization that begins with traumatic events that spark moral outrage.

Today’s post is the third from my “Classic” series laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman — (see “32 page power-point,” pdf link above). In previous posts I gave an overview of Dr. Sageman’s exploration of the dynamics of radicalization, of how people eventually get on the path to political violence. He maintains that these are young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory and the sense of belonging to an important group and cause. It is a bottom-up process involving four major factors: 1) There is a sense of moral outrage. 2) There is a specific interpretation of the meaning of the precipitating event or events. 3) It resonates with their own personal experience. 4) The mobilization takes place through networks.

Section 3 – (pp. 23-30 pdf). “The Expatriate vs. Homegrown Trajectories and Mobilization Through Networks of People with Pre-existing Social Bonds or Operational Links.” Further elaboration of Sageman’s research on 4) above.

The mobilization takes place through networks: The First Wave, the original group, consisted of Osama bin Laden and Dr. al Zawahiri — the “African Arabs” in Afghanistan and the border area of Pakistan. They were followed by the “Second Wave” of jihadis who took two very different paths into subsequent terror networks. The trajectories are described by Sageman as “Expatriates” and “Homegrown.”

The Expatriate Trajectory: The network that eventually culminated in the attacks of 9/11/01 in the U.S. began the 1990’s. They were mostly from the Middle East, upwardly and geographically mobile, the “best and brightest.” They were raised in religious, caring and middle class families. “Global citizens,” they spoke 3 or 4 languages and were skilled in IT. They were sent to the universities of the West, thus separated from their own cultures, leading to being lonely and homesick. Marginalized and excluded from the society of the West, though they adopted the Western lifestyle, they were without relief. So they sought friends, drifting to the mosques for companions, not religion. Eventually they moved in together, ate the same foods, and formed cliques.

The Homegrown Trajectory: In contrast the “homegrown” jihadis were 2nd or 3rd generation men raised and radicalized in Western host countries, but retaining their foreign ideology. They were secular and upwardly mobile, but experienced discrimination and exclusion from the societies in which they were raised. Dropping out of school, they turned to petty crime and drugs, forming gangs. Their collective identity was reactive and resentful. They eventually drifted into religion to escape that situation, according to Dr. Sageman’s research findings.

Mobilization through Networks: (See pdf slides 25 through 30 for Sageman’s fascinating pictorial representations of the global networks as they have evolved over time). The first of the Second Wave networks were face to face and included homegrown neighborhood gangs, both expatriate and homegrown student activities, and 12 radical study groups — about half the sample. Then a gradual shift to online networks occurred, with no space or time limits. This has transformed the participation into an egalitarian threat that includes teenagers and women. Chat-rooms became important virtual “invisible hand” networks.

The group dynamics were increased commitment via interactivity: The groups acted as “echo chambers” encouraging mutual escalation. It was about “cause” and “comrades.” They gradually slid into a violence dynamic of in-group love and out-group hate. Some of them later went to Iraq and blew themselves up. Dr. Sageman discussed the example of the Madrid group. Five of the 7 went to Madrid to be drug dealers who eventually were radicalized. They were secular at the time of the bombing. One felt John Travolta was his hero.

To be continued – “The Evolution of Global Islamist Terror”

I close with some interesting links taken from a pertinent section of my Congressional Quarterly Newsletter. (To sign up for CQ’s free newsletters, click here: http://www.cq.com/corp/newsletters.do), “CQ Homeland Security:”

High profile: “Federal law-enforcement agencies have secretly established profiling techniques to screen immigrants based on their nationalities, protocols that critics charge encourage the unjustified targeting of Muslims,” McClatchy Newspapers leads. “How can terrorists be identified if we are not told what they look like? The terrorists that we know about are bearded dark-skinned men between the ages of 25-40,” a Conservative Voice contributor contends. Among the new counterterror strategies approved for British police are the profiling of Muslim communities and individuals “vulnerable” to extremism, and intervention in prisons to prevent convicted extremists from spreading their beliefs there, Agence France-Presse reports.

Sageman on Leaderless Jihad — 2

July 1, 2008 by Gee Carol · Leave a Comment

Jihad and 21st Century Terrorism,
A Discussion with Marc Sageman on Leaderless Jihad, was a program held at the New America Foundation on Feb. 20, 2008. {This link can provide full video or audio of the event. Here is the link to Sageman’s 32 page power-point presentation; it includes his main lecture ideas.} To quote the synopsis:

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. Rather, it serves as an inspiration for individuals and other groups who have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name.

Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s, builds upon his bestselling book, Understanding Terror Networks, to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In the recently published Leaderless Jihad, Sageman rejects the idea that certain individuals are predisposed to terrorism. He argues that the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process of radicalization that begins with traumatic events that spark moral outrage.

Today’s post is the second in a series from my “Classics” laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman — (see “32 page power-point,” pdf link above):

Section 2: “The process became radicalization, mobilization and evolution of the threat over time.” — (pp. 16-22 pdf)

Dr. Sageman explored the dynamics of radicalization, of how people eventually get on the path to political violence. He maintains that these are young men chasing thrills, fantasies of glory and the sense of belonging to an important group and cause. It is a bottom-up process involving four major factors: 1) There is a sense of moral outrage. 2) There is a specific interpretation of the meaning of the precipitating event or events. 3) It resonates with their own personal experience. 4) The mobilization takes place through networks.

Further elaboration of 1) “moral outrage” — This is anger about a major moral violation; it is not humiliation. It became global after the invasion of Iraq, when before it was confined to the local, involving local police activity. The invasion of Iraq began the activation of Muslim identity, and the local and global reinforce each other.

2) What is the interpretation? It is “war against Islam.” It becomes anti-Americanism and anti-semitism. This does not come from the intellectuals or Islamic scholars; it involves the “sound bite” Islam. The radicals did not get into theological debates. There is a consistency with imbedded cultural beliefs that differ between the U.S. and old Europe. Europe projects various national “essences,” French-ness, Italianate, etc., and Muslims feel left out. On the other hand, the U.S. myth is of a “melting pot.” The American dream is of equal opportunity, and most Muslims believe this is true (Pew research cited by Sageman). Europe has practiced more economic exclusion of Muslim minorities. In addition there are religious differences within Islam. Moderates are more tolerant of religious fundamentalism; the radicals were dominated by Saudis’ Salafi fundamentalism.

3) Dr. Sageman discussed a resonance with personal experiences among the radicalized men. Their own personal grievances were “root causes.” There has also been a historical legacy with which they are familiar. Muslims in Europe are now in a third generation of unskilled laborers, re-builders of Europe. American Muslims are dominated by middle class professionals. The current average income for a family here is $70,000 annually. Muslims generally are employed in the U.S. opposite to the very high unemployment rate for Muslims in foreign nations. Political contributions include the more generous welfare policies in other developed countries, contributing to idleness and boredom, according to Sageman. There has been a failure of governments’ repressive top-down polities, and a resultant Xenophobic backlash. Dr. Sageman reported that most European terrorist plots “were funded with welfare checks.” And he cautioned against underestimating the power of high levels of boredom, contributing to the irresistability of violence. Closing with contrasting data about arrest rates in the U.S. vs Europe, Sageman was able to find 60 arrest records for terrorism related charges in the U.S., “mostly through entrapment through the Bureau,” Sagemen said. In contrast there were 2,400 arrests in Europe, “with no entrapment.” That is six times the arrest rate.

4) Joining jihad, forming networks of trust — Two-thirds of the men linking into the terrorist networks were expatriates. And Dr. Sageman found that over 90% had some association with the phenomena of the diaspora — 80% were 2nd and 3rd generation and young expatriates. There was a pre-existing friendship for 70% of the men joining; 20% involved kinship. Sageman characterized the groups as “spontaneous, sel-organized bunches of guys (networks of trust) from the bottom up. It was self-selection and mutual self-recruitment.

To be continued – “The trajectories of the mobilization of expatriate and home-grown terrorists into networks.”

I close with some interesting links taken from a current pertinent section of my Congressional Quarterly Newsletter. (To sign up for CQ’s free newsletters, click here: http://www.cq.com/corp/newsletters.do), “CQ Homeland Security:”

Over there: A U.S. chopper-fired missile killed a Saudi al-Qaeda-in-Iraq leader last week, the Post has officials confirming - as the Times sees the Pentagon planning to dispatch 100 trainers to assist Pakistani vanguard anti-jihadi forces. The U.N. is now seen as an “enemy” and a legitimate target for attacks because of its perceived lack of impartiality, The Melbourne Herald Sun quotes a retired U.N. troubleshooter. The story of an escaped convict’s surprise appearance in - and equally abrupt disappearance from - a Yemeni court illuminates “the distinctive counterterrorism efforts of Yemen, long considered a haven for jihadists,” the Times, again, spotlights - while AP hasInterpol issuing a worldwide security alert for the Islamist terror leader who escaped from a Singapore jail. A Moroccan anti-terror judge has jailed 35 alleged members of an Islamist cell, AFP finds - as The Seattle Times has Algerian security forces reportedly killing 25 suspected al Qaeda affiliates in a weekend operation.

Sageman on Leaderless Jihad

June 24, 2008 by Gee Carol · Leave a Comment

Jihad and 21st Century Terrorism,

In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. Rather, it serves as an inspiration for individuals and other groups who have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name.

Marc Sageman, a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s, builds upon his bestselling book, Understanding Terror Networks, to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In the recently published Leaderless Jihad, Sageman rejects the idea that certain individuals are predisposed to terrorism. He argues that the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process of radicalization that begins with traumatic events that spark moral outrage.

Today’s is from my “Classic” category, a follow up to an earlier post, “Fear innoculations” — I happened on to this story after reading Kevin Drum’s post* that referred to an Op-ed piece by David Ignatius at the Washington Post (2/28/08). Here is what I wrote:

Fear about “what will happen to us” in our country need not be as endemic as currently seems to be the case. There are antidotes to this national poison. The venom of fear-mongering can be neutralized by using the following pain relievers. Here are my prescriptions:

Healing compound – Knowledge and information is an important antidote that raises alternative possibilities. The very best example of this is a dissenting view to the concept of the Global War on Terror (GWOT for short). I learned about it from the Washington Post’s Op-ed piece by David Ignatius, titled “The Fading Jihadists.” Ignatius says, “Politicians who talk about the terrorism threat — and it’s already clear that this will be a polarizing issue in the 2008 campaign — should be required to read a new book by a former CIA officer named Marc Sageman. It stands what you think you know about terrorism on its head and helps you see the topic in a different light.”

Today’s post begins a series laying out the most important new ideas and ways of thinking I learned from Marc Sageman — (see “32 page power-point,” pdf link above):

Section I — “Evidence based research”

The author used the scientific method (p.3 pdf) about a group of 400-500 terrorists. The sample consisted of the 19 men who attacked the U.S. on 9/11/01, plus those who are somehow linked to them through some kind of relationships. To quote: “evidence based terrorism research, open source data” was used to reach his conclusions: “Specific threat to the U.S. — 9/11 perpetrators as index sample, — 400 biographical fragments, — Trial transcripts> OSC> Academic papers”. He looked for evidence mostly outside of the U.S. — in Europe and elsewhere — because those trials were public, unlike those here and in Cuba.

Sageman’s sample consists of men who are distinguished because they attacked “the far enemy.” That designation applies to people who came from Middle Eastern repressive regimes “propped up” by the West, “the near enemy” Middle East (infidel) Muslims. The thinking was that the “far enemy” had to be driven out of those countries before there was a chance to take down the central governments. The primary goal of Al-Qaeda has been to establish Salafist states. So far, the three main efforts to do that - in Afghanistan, Algeria and Al-Anbar in Iraq, have been unsuccessful.

Characteristics of the research sample — (see pp. 4-15 of pdf above). Most were from middle class families of origin. The vast majority were not devoted to Islam as youth, but secular. Almost all received a secular education (in order of dominance): Technical (Engineering, etc.), High School/Vocational, or Humanities. Most of them had a lack of job opportunity because they were unskilled. Less than half were professionals. All were underemployed. An amazing 73% were married; two-thirds of those had children. A big majority, 90%, had no criminal record. Some had a history of political activism.If there was a record of major crime it was for robbery or drugs. Petty crime (the Maghreb logistic cells), was for credit card fraud, false documents, insurance fraud or drug traffic (more common now). Antisocial Personality Disorder, the sociopaths, included only two, Abu Masab al Zarqawi and the leader of the Madrid bombers, according to Dr. Sageman.

To be continued — “The process became radicalization, mobilization and evolution of the threat over time.”

My links:

*Washington Monthly’s Political Animal, Kevin Drum recently posted about Leaderless Jihad (2/28/08).
Here is the Washington Times article (2/19/08).
The Economist wrote an excellent review on 1/31/08, “Al-Qaeda/ how jihad went freelance,” HT to PennPressLog.
David Isenberg wrote a most useful lengthy review, “A fresh look at terrorism’s roots” for Asia Times online on January 19. HT to War in Context for the link.
Leaderless Jihad is an Amazon.com link that contains a full book description and several good reviews.
Book TV on C-SPAN2 showed Sageman’s presentation twice last night.
Dr. Marc Sageman — Speaker’s Bio from the University of Pennsylvania. To quote:

Marc Sageman is a Clinical Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. After graduating from Harvard, he obtained an MD and a PhD in Sociology from New York University. After a tour as a flightsurgeon in the U.S. Navy, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1984. He spent a year on the Afghan Task Force then went to Islamabad from 1987 to 1989, where he ran the U.S. unilateral programs with the Afghan Mujahedin. In 1991, he resigned from the agency to return to medicine. He completed a residency in psychiatry at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. Since 1994, he has been in the private practice of forensic and clinical psychiatry, and had the opportunity to evaluate about 500 murderers. After 9/11/01, he started collecting biographical material on about 400 al Qaeda terrorists to test the validity of the conventional wisdom on terrorism. This research has been published as Understanding Terror Network earlier this year. He has testified before the 9/11 Commission and has become a consultant to various government agencies on terrorism.